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MISSION (IM)POSSIBILITY: DETERMINING WHEN 
MANDAMUS IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO ADDRESS 
AGENCY DELAY OR INACTION 
Faith Proper* 
Abstract 
Judicial review of administrative agency delay or inaction presents 
delicate questions about, and potent opportunities to define, the balance 
of power within the American system of governance. Recently, a 
significant backlog of Medicare appeals for healthcare providers has 
spawned litigation, with providers asking the courts to address agency 
delay by compelling action through a writ of mandamus. Though relying 
on substantively similar factual bases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reached divergent mandamus analyses. Despite differing 
outcomes, both analyses suffer from the same fundamental flaws: the 
courts not only fail to identify the cause of the problem, but also fail to 
design a remedy that addresses that cause. This Note argues that courts 
should make an explicit factual finding of possibility before issuing a writ 
of mandamus against an administrative agency due to inaction or delay. 
Adding this element in the initial mandamus inquiry will help courts 
avoid dictating policy priorities, avoid infringing on the legislative 
funding power, and accord proper respect to the underlying principles of 
the separation of powers within the American system.  
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“[T]he most serious mistakes are not being made as a result of wrong 
answers. The truly dangerous thing is asking the wrong questions.” 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review of administrative agency inaction and delay presents 
delicate questions about, and potent opportunities to define, the balance 
within the American system.2 Constitutionally-founded checks and 
balances are increasingly scarce in a progressively administrative state,3 
and striking the right balance between efficiency and tyranny is no small 
task.4 Administrative agencies play a vital yet not constitutionalized role 
that treads a fine line between efficiency and overreach.5 The courts’ role 
in monitoring or reforming agency action must walk—and often draw—
a line between process and policy, enforcing the former while leaving the 
latter to the political branches.6  
The tension between agency autonomy and judicial oversight has been 
set in sharp relief through recent litigation about a backlog in Medicare 
claims on appeal.7 In the face of agency inaction, healthcare providers 
sought refuge in the courts to address the delays.8 Though relying on 
 
 1. PETER F. DRUCKER, MEN, IDEAS, AND POLITICS, at ix (2010). 
 2. See generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent 
Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1381 (2011) (discussing one possible way to frame the tensions inherent in an 
administrative state). 
 3. See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of 
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 190 (2011) (discussing the impact of increased 
administrative power on constitutional due process guarantees). 
 4. See generally D.A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49 
(2017) (arguing that the administrative state relies on assumptions that inherently conflict with 
the U.S. Constitution). 
 5. See generally Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. 
REV. 1215, 1215 (2014) (arguing that American administrative rules fulfill important functions, 
including “determining institutional boundaries, establishing the government–citizen relationship, 
and protecting fundamental values.”). 
 6. Criddle, supra note 3, at 135–37 (discussing the development of the nondelegation 
doctrine).  
 7. See HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, HHS.GOV 3, https://www.hhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9AA-6ZMS] (describing 
the backlog). 
 8. See generally, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (seeking 
mandamus to compel the Secretary of Health and Human Services to process administrative 
appeals of denials of Medicare patient reimbursement claims within the statutory timeline). 
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substantively similar factual bases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reached opposing outcomes on whether mandamus was an 
appropriate remedy.9 Cabining the question of which court arrived at the 
“right” answer, this Note argues that both courts’ analyses suffer from the 
same fundamental flaws: the courts not only fail to identify the 
underlying cause of the problem, but also fail to design a remedy that 
addresses that cause.10 Understanding the cause of a problem is an 
essential step in determining an appropriate solution. Because an 
agency’s power to fix a problem is limited by the role the agency plays 
in creating the problem, determining the root cause would allow the court 
to determine whether a writ of mandamus would be effective. This Note 
argues that courts should include an explicit factual finding of possibility 
before issuing a writ of mandamus simply ordering an agency to take 
action. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief description 
of the statutorily established Medicare appeals process and paints a 
picture of the backlog that led to litigation beginning in 2014. Part II 
describes the diverging decisions between the Fourth and D.C. Circuits 
in declining and granting mandamus, respectively. Part III argues that 
neither court’s process was sufficient for fashioning an appropriate 
remedy because both courts failed to define whether the problem was 
caused by inadequate funding or inefficient management. If the backlog 
was caused by inefficient management of agency resources, mandamus 
is an appropriate remedy because this is a cause internal to the agency 
and, thus, more within the agency’s control to fix. However, if the 
backlog was caused by inadequate funding, mandamus is not an 
appropriate remedy because the court cannot and should not order an 
agency to do what an agency cannot possibly do without legislative 
intervention. Part III also suggests a solution: courts should incorporate 
an explicit factual finding of possibility before issuing a writ of 
mandamus against an administrative agency to ensure that the writ does 
not infringe on the legislative purview by dictating funding priorities to 
Congress. This Note concludes with a broader discussion of the 




 9. See infra Sections II.B, II.C (describing the different analyses and outcomes). 
 10. See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
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I.  THE MEDICARE APPEALS PROCESS AND BACKLOG 
Medicare is the United States’ federally funded health insurance 
program for individuals over the age of sixty-five or with certain medical 
disabilities.11 As a single-payer program, Medicare unifies healthcare 
services for its beneficiaries by providing payment directly to healthcare 
providers.12 Medicare accounts for 14% of the entire federal budget and 
cost $582 billion in the 2018 fiscal year.13 Financing approximately 20% 
of all healthcare spending in the United States,14 Medicare plays a vital 
role in supporting the sustainability of the entire American healthcare 
system.15 Considering that 44 million people (about 15% of the U.S. 
population) are covered by Medicare, the stakes are high.16 So, by 
statute,17 Congress has established a comprehensive process for both 
individuals and providers to appeal Medicare coverage and 
reimbursement determinations.18 Beginning in 2013, the number of 
appeals surged,19 causing a significant backlog of pending appeals that 
the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA) was unable to 
adjudicate within the statutory deadlines.20 This Part explains the 
Medicare appeals process, timelines, and alleged causes of the backlog.  
A.  The Medicare Appeals Process 
After treating patients covered by Medicare, healthcare providers 
submit a claim for reimbursement that is reviewed by a Medicare 
Administrative Contractor (MAC).21 The MAC makes an initial 
determination on payment within 45 days of receiving the claim.22 If the 
 
 11. Medicare Program - General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/FXQ5-C5J3] (last modified Nov. 13, 2019, 10:51 PM). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Budget Basics: Medicare, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://www.pgpf.org/budget-basics/budget-explainer-medicare [https://perma.cc/HH6A-9RTY]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Bob Rosenblatt, Why Medicare Matters to All Americans, AARP (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2017/why-medicare-matters-to-all-americans.html 
[https://perma.cc/657X-7AKZ]. 
 16. BEN UMANS & K. LYNN NONNEMAKER, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., THE MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARY POPULATION 1 (2009), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/fs149_medicare.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MR43-JH67]. 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012) (outlining the appeals process). 
 18. See HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 19. Id. at 3 (showing an increase from approximately 100,000 claims in 2012 to over 
400,000 claims in 2013). 
 20. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 
(D.C. Cir. 2016).  
 21. Id. at 46; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1(a)(1)–(4). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(2)(A). 
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claim is denied and the healthcare provider wants to appeal that 
determination, Congress has established a four-step appellate process, 
which includes the possibility of escalation for judicial review on the 
merits.23 First, within 120 days, the healthcare provider may request a 
redetermination by the MAC; once requested, the MAC must reconsider 
the decision within 60 days.24 If unsatisfied, the healthcare provider may 
appeal next to a Qualified Independent Contractor (QIC).25 The QIC has 
up to 60 days to consider the appeal and return a decision.26 Both the 
MACs and QICs operate under the umbrella of Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS).27 If the healthcare provider wants to appeal 
the QIC’s determination, the healthcare provider can file a request for a 
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in OMHA.28 OMHA is 
independent of CMS;29 thus, arguably, this third stage is the first 
opportunity for all parties to present their cases in a neutral forum.30 ALJs 
have 90 days from the time the healthcare provider requests a hearing to 
issue a decision.31 After the ALJ has issued a decision, healthcare 
providers have one final administrative stop before escalation to the 
federal district court: an appeal to a division of the Departmental Appeals 
Board (DAB), which conducts a de novo review.32 The DAB has 90 days 
to issue a decision and rarely holds a hearing unless presented with a 
particularly unique or challenging point of fact or law.33 The DAB makes 
a determination on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
 
 23. Id. § 1395ff(b)(1)(A); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 1. 
See generally, e.g., Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Price, No. 5:15-CV-319-D, 2017 WL 
1048102 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2017) (adjudicating a Medicare claim for reimbursement for 
approximately $66,000 on the merits), adopted by 2017 WL 1049476 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2017).  
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(3)(C); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 
7, at 1. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(B)(i); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra 
note 7, at 1. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(i); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra 
note 7, at 2. 
 27. See HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 2. 
 28. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A). 
 29. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 
(D.C. Cir. 2016); HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 2. 
 30. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 46. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 46. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(2). The specific division of the DAB that reviews Medicare 
claims is called the Medicare Appeals Council, and this body is referred to as the “MAC” in 
relevant regulations. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 46. To avoid confusion, the courts (and 
this Note) adopt the conventions of the parties and refer to the body overseeing this fourth and 
final administrative step as “DAB.” See id. 
 33. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186.  
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(Secretary).34 This determination may be appealed to a federal district 
court to evaluate the merits of reimbursement for the underlying claim.35 
If this stage is reached, the district court judge evaluates whether the 
patient’s treatment for her medical conditions fall within the Medicare 
guidelines.36 
Central to the question of mandamus, the Medicare Act provides 
healthcare providers with the opportunity to “escalate” a claim if forced 
to wait longer than the prescribed statutory period.37 Thus, a healthcare 
provider who waits longer than 60 days for a decision from a QIC may 
escalate the appeal to the ALJ;38 a healthcare provider who waits longer 
than 90 days for an ALJ decision may escalate the appeal to the DAB;39 
and a healthcare provider who waits longer than 90 days for a DAB 
decision may escalate the appeal to a federal district court by filing a civil 
action.40 The federal district court may then review the case on the merits, 
but the standard of review is more deferential to the decision of the last 
deliberative administrative body than the ALJ’s essentially de novo 
review.41  
B.  The Medicare Appeals Backlog 
Beginning in 2012, an increased volume of claims overwhelmed this 
appellate process.42 Between 2010 and 2015, OMHA experienced a 
442% increase in the number of appeals received annually.43 During this 
timeframe, however, OMHA’s funding remained stagnant.44 By the end 
of 2015, over 800,000 appeals were pending adjudication.45 The causes 
of this increase are debated. The Secretary points primarily to external 
factors, including a surge in the number of Medicare enrollees as “baby 
 
 34. See Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/about/ 
agencies/dab/index.html [https://perma.cc/N68P-CZ7P].  
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(2)(C)(i); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186. 
 36. See, e.g., Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Price, No. 5:15-CV-319-D, 2017 WL 
1048102, at *18 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2017) (discussing the underlying claim of medical necessity 
in great detail, holding that a Medicare reimbursement claim was improperly denied, and 
reversing in favor of the healthcare provider), adopted by 2017 WL 1049476 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 
2017). 
 37. See id. at *2. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(ii). 
 39. Id. § 1395ff(d)(3)(A).  
 40. Id. § 1395ff(d)(3)(B). 
 41. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 42. HHS Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 3. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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boomers” become eligible,46 additional appeals resulting from a new 
Recovery Audit Program (instituted in 2010 in response to a 
Congressional mandate to increase accountability and accuracy in 
Medicare reimbursements), and additional Medicaid State Agency 
appeals of Medicare and Medicaid coverage denials.47 In contrast, 
healthcare providers pointed to factors internal to the agency that were 
contributing to the backlog, including the Secretary’s refusal to settle 
pending claims en masse48 and an overzealous Recovery Audit Program49 
that reclaims improperly reimbursed Medicare claims due to “perverse 
[financial] incentives.”50 Whatever the cause, according to the 
Secretary’s own estimates, it would take over ten years to address a 
backlog of this size (assuming no additional appeals are filed).51 With 
millions of dollars at stake, some healthcare providers opted to carve their 
own pathway towards reimbursement through the courts.  
II.  DIVERGING MANDAMUS DECISIONS 
Facing large deductions from anticipated operating budgets, some 
healthcare providers pursued a new path forward: petitioning the courts 
to issue a writ of mandamus to force administrative action.52 This writ, if 
granted, would order the Secretary to hear the healthcare providers’ 
pending appeals within the statutory period of ninety days and require the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to comply with 
the statutory timelines for appeals from all healthcare providers.53 This 
 
 46. See American Generation Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/us/ 
baby-boomer-generation-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/5XBD-FSAJ] (last updated Aug. 
17, 2019, 9:36 AM) (stating that the baby boom began between 1943 and 1946 and led to a peak 
population of 78.8 million baby boomers).  
 47. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 2016); see HHS 
Primer: The Medicare Appeals Process, supra note 7, at 3. 
 48. Cf. Matt Phifer, Let’s Make a Deal: Medicare Expands Settlement Process, 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 24, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-
business/lets-make-a-deal-medicare-expands-settlement-process [https://perma.cc/XYS3-N9MD]. 
 49. See generally Program History and Authorities, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/ 
recovery-audit-program-parts-c-and-d/Program-History-and-Authorities.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8LY6-GKTQ] (last updated Nov. 15, 2019, 5:39 PM) (explaining the history of creating and 
expanding the Recovery Audit Program).  
 50. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 51 (stating that the independent contractors 
hired to run the Recovery Audit Program are inappropriately paid on a contingency basis 
calculated based on how much money is reclaimed from reimbursements already given to 
healthcare providers).  
 51. Id. at 50–51.  
 52. Complaint at 21–22, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 209 F. Supp. 3d 221 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(No. 1:14-cv-851). 
 53. Id. 
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Part describes the elements of mandamus, outlines the two cases at the 
center of the circuit split, and describes each court’s analysis leading up 
to either granting or denying mandamus.  
A.  Elements of Mandamus 
District courts have original jurisdiction in a federal mandamus action 
and may compel a federal officer or agency to perform a duty owed to the 
plaintiff.54 Injunctive relief is not a right55 but rather a tool left to the 
court’s discretion that should be exercised for the public good within the 
bounds of the law.56 The three elements to establish a right to mandamus 
are well-known and uncontroversial. Mandamus will be issued when: (1) 
the plaintiff has a clear and demonstrable right to relief; (2) there is a clear 
duty imposed on the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) no other 
adequate remedy is available.57 With this foundation in the elements of 
mandamus, the following subsections describe the two cases: one 
granting mandamus and one denying mandamus.   
B.  American Hospital Association v. Burwell 
American Hospital Association v. Burwell58 is the first major case 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking for a 
writ of mandamus rather than judicial review on the merits of the claim. 
The healthcare-provider plaintiffs asserted that escalation was not an 
adequate alternative remedy because it would force them to relinquish the 
right to establish an administrative record during the ALJ hearing.59 
Without the administrative record from the ALJ hearing, the DAB would 
likely base its review solely on the MAC record.60 Sympathetic to the 
healthcare providers’ argument, the D.C. District Court issued 
 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012).  
 55. See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 8385 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019). 
 56. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948) (“[D]eclaratory judgment, like other 
forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the 
public interest.”). 
 57. See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. 
Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999); Ethel R. Alston, 
Annotation, Mandamus, Under 28 U.S.C.A. §1361, to Compel Prompt Hearing in Appeal from 
Denial of Social Security Disability Benefits, 47 A.L.R. Fed. 929 (2011). 
 58. 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 59. Id. at 48.  
 60. Id. (“[A]lthough the DAB may conduct additional proceedings, it is not required to do 
so. . . . As a consequence, hospitals find that they are most likely to succeed on their appeals at 
the ALJ level.”). 
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mandamus.61 The mandamus order discussed the form of relief the court 
would provide and, due to lack of a suggested plan from the Secretary, 
relied heavily on the plaintiffs’ suggested remedies.62 The order targeted 
the backlog existing in the third stage of the Medicare appeals process—
the ALJ hearings—and set percentage reduction goals for the Secretary 
to meet over the next four years.63 The order also provided that any 
healthcare providers with claims still pending on January 1, 2021, that 
have been pending for longer than one year may petition a federal court 
for a declaratory judgment in their favor for payment on the claim.64 
After the D.C. District Court denied the Secretary’s motion for 
reconsideration,65 the Secretary appealed to the D.C. Circuit.66 The 
Secretary argued that it would be impossible to meet the timeline set by 
the D.C. District Court given current funding and congressional 
constraints.67 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Secretary (to an extent), 
vacated the mandamus order, and remanded to the D.C. District Court for 
an explicit finding of possibility.68 Regardless of the vacated mandamus 
order, however, the Secretary and Congress had already begun to take 
financial steps to comply with the D.C. District Court’s timeline.69 Part 
III will take up the trajectory of this case again. 
C.  Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. v. Burwell70 
Meanwhile, in North Carolina, Cumberland County Hospital System 
had a similar idea but received a less welcome outcome.71 Like the 
American Hospital Association, Cumberland County Hospital System 
brought an action requesting that the court force the Secretary to meet the 
statutory deadlines for administrative review of denied claims for 
 
 61. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2016 WL 7076983, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 62. See id. at *2–3. 
 63. Id. at *3 (ordering the Secretary to reduce the backlog by 30% by the end of 2017, 60% 
by the end of 2018, 90% by the end of 2019, and eliminate the backlog by the end of 2020).  
 64. Id. 
 65. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2017 WL 6209175, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 4, 2017), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 66. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 867 F.3d at 165.  
 67. Id. (arguing that meeting the timeline would (1) require illegally eliminating the RAC 
program, (2) require violating the Medicare Act by resolving claims en masse and not based on 
merit, and (3) exacerbate the backlog by giving healthcare providers a perverse incentive to file 
unmeritorious claims with the hope and knowledge of the pending deadline). 
 68. See id. at 161 (stating that “[o]ught implies can” when issuing a writ of mandamus). 
 69. See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text.  
 70. 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 71. See id. at 57. 
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Medicare reimbursement.72 While advancing similar arguments as the 
American Hospital Association, Cumberland County Hospital System 
further argued that the third stage of administrative review, before an ALJ 
in OMHA, presents the first opportunity for hospitals to obtain a hearing 
and review by an independent adjudicator with no financial stake in the 
outcome.73 While evaluating the appropriateness of the mandamus 
remedy, the district court focused on whether the statute provided a 
“[c]lear right to relief and clear duty to act.”74 The district court found 
that the statute did not impose a clear duty on the Secretary to act within 
the timeline;75 rather, the court found that the escalation procedures 
spelled out within the same statute76 indicate that Congress anticipated 
delays in the Medicare appeals adjudication process and prescribed the 
appropriate remedy.77 Given the full context of the statute, the court 
found that Congress did not intend to confer an imperative duty on the 
Secretary78 but rather to set forth the recommended process to be 
followed in adjudicating Medicare appeals.79 
Beyond this, the court further stated that equitable considerations 
weighed against granting mandamus in this situation.80 The court 
emphasized that mandamus is a drastic remedy that is appropriate only in 
tightly cabined circumstances.81 Citing the district court opinion in 
American Hospital Association v. Burwell,82 this court stated that the state 
of affairs at OMHA was beyond the ability of the court to solve83:  
Congress funds OMHA, Congress created the RAC 
program, and Congress is aware of the inundation of appeals 
. . . . So what might the Court do? It makes little sense to 
force the Secretary to ask Congress for funding to solve a 
problem of which Congress is well aware. At best, [issuing 
mandamus] would be an empty gesture, at worst judicial 
overstepping.84  
 
 72. See Complaint, at 1, Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 
2015), aff’d, 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 73. See id. at 3. 
 74. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14–CV–508–BR, 2015 WL 
1249959, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015). 
 75. Id. at *6. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012). 
 77. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 2015 WL 1249959, at *6. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at *7.  
 81. Id. at *5.   
 82. 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 83. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 2015 WL 1249959, at *8. 
 84. Id. at *7 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 55). 
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The court discussed the difficult and precarious financial situation of 
OMHA and found that the Secretary had limited flexibility to address the 
problem.85 Without making a factual finding as to the cause of the 
problem, the court held that the problem was best left for the political 
branches to address.86 Implying that the court believed the issue to be 
inadequate resources, the court stated that intervening would not solve 
the problem but would simply disrupt the Secretary’s ability to allocate 
limited resources amongst competing priorities.87 So, while sympathetic 
to the difficult position the delays placed the Cumberland County 
Hospital System in, the court declined to intervene.88 On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision denying mandamus.89 
The court agreed with the district court’s equitable concerns, indicating 
that this problem was best left for the political branches.90  
D.  Diverging Analyses 
There are two main differences between the D.C. Circuit and Fourth 
Circuit approaches. First, the D.C. Circuit put more emphasis on the 
mandatory nature of the administrator’s duty to hear Medicare appeals 
cases within 90 days at the ALJ stage. Second, the Fourth Circuit found 
the statutory escalation procedures adequate, while the D.C. Circuit did 
not. In these cases, the courts’ analyses first diverge in their 
interpretations of the word “shall.” Differing interpretations of the word 
“shall” led to different outcomes. The D.C. Circuit emphasized the 
mandatory nature of this word as yielding both a right and a duty,91 while 
the Fourth Circuit found the language directive rather than obligatory—
given the analysis of the entire statutory scheme as a whole—and found 
neither a right nor a duty imposed on the Secretary.92  
The other substantive point of disagreement is the courts’ analyses of 
whether the statutorily provided escalation procedure yields an 
“adequate” alternative remedy. Surprisingly, neither court defined the 
term “adequate” or explained its rationale behind its decision on this 
factor.93 The Fourth Circuit stood behind the sufficiency of the process 
established by the Medicare Act.94 The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
 
 85. Id. at *8. 
 86. Id. at *9. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *10. 
 89. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 90. Id. 
 91. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 92. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56. 
 93. See id. at 52; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191. 
 94. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56. 
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argument that the third stage—review by an ALJ—provides significant 
procedural rights unavailable at other points in the process.95 Indeed, the 
Fourth Circuit pointed out that there is no guaranteed right to introduce 
new evidence during the ALJ stage even when that stage is reached.96 On 
the other hand, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the escalation process 
available by statute is insufficient given the unlikelihood of receiving a 
timely hearing by moving past the ALJ to the DAB.97 The court stated 
that “[m]erely providing a consequence for noncompliance does not 
necessarily undermine the force of [the] command.”98  
The problem inherent in these conflicting analyses is that both are 
justifiable given the content of the statute and prevailing norms of 
statutory construction.99 In the face of two justifiable explanations, the 
Fourth Circuit exercised deference to the legislative process,100 while the 
D.C. Circuit decided that judicial action was justified to enforce what it 
perceived as already declared mandatory deadlines.101 While an entire 
paper could be dedicated to a discussion of which court got it “right,”102 
subsequent events moot this discussion: Congress decided to act.103 In 
light of this development, this Note discusses the implications of the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision to issue mandamus and questions whether clearing the 
backlog was achieved in a constitutionally justifiable manner.  
III.  THE ENDS AND THE MEANS 
Although Congress has acted to moot this controversy by increasing 
the agency’s funding, the larger question regarding the propriety of using 
mandamus relief to redress the quagmire remains. Because neither court 
identified the cause of the problem before determining the appropriate 
solution, both circuits risk inefficiency and infringement by not 
determining when mandamus would help to solve the problem. This Part 
 
 95. Id. at 55–56. 
 96. Id. at 56.  
 97. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191. 
 98. Id. at 190. 
 99. For an interesting discussion of the modern rules of statutory interpretation, see 
generally Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey 
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018).  
 100. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56. 
 101. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 190. 
 102. See, e.g., Stephen C. Robin, Recent Development, Healing Medicare: Enforcing 
Administrative Law Deadlines in Medicare Appeals, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1293, 1310–12 (2017) 
(discussing how courts should enforce agency deadlines when facing agency inaction and 
concluding in favor of the D.C. Circuit’s approach).  
 103. Virgil Dickson, Medicare Appeals Backlog Plummets More than 30% Since 2017, 
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identifies problems with both courts’ analyses and argues, as a threshold 
matter, that courts should make an explicit finding that it is possible for 
the agency to comply with the writ of mandamus before continuing any 
mandamus analysis. This finding of fact that an agency is able to comply 
with the order will enhance judicial efficiency and avoid infringing on 
separation of powers principles. 
A.  An Unexpected Outcome 
Temporarily leaving aside any concerns with the circuits’ analyses, 
something unexpected happened: Congress acted.104 After the mandamus 
relief was ordered in December of 2016, Congress appropriated 
significant additional funding to OMHA.105 The increased funding 
enabled the Secretary to hire additional ALJs and double OMHA’s 
previous adjudication capacity.106 Because of this increased funding—
coupled with increased settlement initiatives—the Secretary now projects 
that OMHA will eliminate the backlog by 2022.107 The American 
Hospital Association objected to this timeline.108 It argued that this 
timeline does not comply with the court’s order and is insufficient given 
OMHA’s newfound resources.109 The D.C. District Court ordered 
mandamus that aligns with the government’s own projections.110 The 
order requires the government to reduce the backlog by 19% by the end 
of fiscal year 2019, 49% by the end of fiscal year 2020, 75% by the end 
of fiscal year 2021, and to eliminate the backlog by the end of fiscal year 
2022.111  
This series of events begs the question: does it matter if the court was 
right to issue mandamus in the first place? Congress took action to resolve 
an ongoing problem that had been neglected for years. While correlation 
 
 104. Jacqueline LaPointe, HHS to Clear Medicare Appeals Backlog by 2022, Court Docs 
Show, REVCYCLEINTELLIGENCE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/hhs-to-
clear-medicare-appeals-backlog-by-2022-court-docs-show [https://perma.cc/GJ3R-JGC6]. 
 105. Defendant’s Status Report and Response to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Non-Deadline 
Remedies at 1,  Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB) (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2018) [hereinafter 
Defendant’s Status Report]; HHS Fiscal Year 2018 Budget in Brief - OMHA, HHS, 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2018/budget-in-brief/omha/index.html [https://perma.cc/3 
EJT-PEBD] (last updated May 23, 2017); Matt Phifer, Hospitals, Government at Odds Over 
Medicare Appeals Drawdown, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018, 4:09 PM), https://news. 
bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/hospitals-government-at-odds-over-medicare-
appeals-drawdown [https://perma.cc/QT78-BG9G].  
 106. Defendant’s Status Report, supra note 105.  
 107. Id.   
 108. LaPointe, supra note 104.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141, at *3–4 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 1, 2018). 
 111. Id. at *3.  
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does not amount to causation, the timing is too coincidentally close to 
seriously argue that the court’s decision on mandamus was a nonfactor in 
Congress’s appropriations decisions. So, when all is said and done, does 
it matter if mandamus was appropriate in this situation? Do the ends 
justify the means?  
This Note argues that the means matter—or, rather, that they should 
matter. The outcome in this case amounts to judges legislating from the 
bench, determining legislative priorities through judicial fiat. Due to the 
national role of HHS, one activist circuit controlled the outcome for the 
entire country. This decision has precarious implications for the 
separation of powers.  
In the face of ambiguity, judicial deference to executive interpretation 
and agency prioritization has long been the standard.112 The strongest 
rationale the D.C. Circuit presented in issuing mandamus was an 
obligation to “enforce the law as Congress has written it.”113 However, 
given the built-in relief valve in the system through the ability to escalate 
a claim,114 the deadline in question is not unambiguously mandatory. 
Even in situations where Congress has written a clear and unambiguous 
mandatory deadline, the courts are split on whether an action under 
§ 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)115 grants the courts 
discretion when the agency misses a mandatory deadline or if the courts 
are mandated to enforce the deadline without deference to agency 
priorities.116 The D.C. Circuit picked and chose from its own 
precedent,117 focusing on the extended delay present in this case to justify 
intervention. By doing so, the D.C. Circuit exercised pressure on the 
legislative branch to act quickly or risk placing the executive branch in 
contempt of court. While Congress can attempt to limit an agency’s 
discretion in implementing policy directives through clear directives,118 
the amount of funding originally appropriated speaks even louder than 
the statutory relief valve as to congressional priorities: OMHA’s ability 
 
 112. See generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive 
Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 912 (2017) (stating that judicial deference to executive and 
administrative interpretation “casts a long shadow” over American administrative law).  
 113. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
 114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(3) (2012). 
 115. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 116. See generally Catherine Zaller, Note, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of 
Mandatory Agency Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1546 (2001) 
(discussing varied interpretations of § 706(1) of the APA as it relates to the courts’ discretion).  
 117. See, e.g., In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 554 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (arguing that limited resources provide only a temporary excuse for inaction when facing a 
statutory deadline).  
 118. See Zaller, supra note 116, at 1553.  
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to meet the statutory deadlines was not a congressional priority until the 
D.C. Circuit made it so.  
Granted, “[i]nformal pressure” has been recognized as acceptable 
under the separation of powers doctrine.119 While the Constitution 
assigns functions to the different branches and officials of government, 
“separation of powers does not prohibit officials in other branches from 
using their governmental power to exert informal influence over the 
carrying out of th[at] function.”120 Indeed, this is quite commonplace; the 
President may consider the impact on his legislative agenda if he pursues 
an unpopular appointment,121 and agencies look to congressional 
committee records for indications of how the legislature intended that 
funds be spent.122 But this case is distinguished from these typical and 
expected political barters: this is a case of formal, not informal, pressure. 
The D.C. Circuit ordered the district court to issue mandamus to the 
Secretary.123 This order resulted in legislative, rather than administrative, 
action. This type of political maneuver is expected in the halls of the 
Capitol but is disillusioning and discouraging coming from the federal 
bench.  
The events of this case make clear that at least Congress believed that 
OMHA truly did not have sufficient resources to properly enact its 
mandate as interpreted by the court.124 Once the D.C. District Court 
issued mandamus, Congress allocated significant additional funding to 
OMHA, even though the order was still being appealed.125 Ironically, the 
D.C. District Court eventually stated that complying with the order of 
mandamus was “possible” only in light of the additional funding granted 
by Congress.126 Essentially, this writ of mandamus functioned as a 
judicial order dictating the legislative agenda; since this agenda was 
followed post hoc, the originating order was self-justified. 
  
 
 119. Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 467, 510 (2011) (emphasis omitted). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump’s Pick for 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/ 
brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/KW9T-EF68]. 
 122. Beermann, supra note 119, at 511.  
 123. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Azar, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2018 WL 5723141, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 
1, 2018). 
 124. See id. at *2.  
 125. Defendant’s Status Report, supra note 105, at 1; HHS Fiscal Year 2018, supra note 105; 
Phifer, supra note 105. 
 126. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2018 WL 5723141, at *4. 
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B.  An Undefined Problem 
Though reaching different results, both circuits prescribed treatment 
without ever diagnosing the cause. The Fourth Circuit evaded the 
question of causation by leaving the remedy entirely to the political 
process.127 In doing so, the court assumed that a legislative solution was 
available to solve what could just as easily have been an issue of agency 
drift or mismanagement of resources. The D.C. Circuit took a more 
straightforward “enough is enough” stance and ordered action, in 
whatever form the Secretary saw fit, to fix the problem.128 The court 
assumed that there were solutions within the Secretary’s power to pursue. 
Both courts erred in failing to identify the root cause of the problem 
before providing an answer.  
This is not to say that the courts did not exercise sufficient caution in 
their analyses. Both courts acknowledged the underlying equitable nature 
of mandamus: even if the courts can properly exercise mandamus 
jurisdiction,129 that does not mean they should.130 A preference for one 
circuit’s outcome over the other is rooted in a philosophical preference 
for a deferential or active judiciary.131 This Note does not argue that either 
court failed to exercise sufficient caution or due care in making a 
decision. Indeed, each circuit can be seen as deferring to different parts 
in the legislative timeline: the Fourth Circuit deferred to the ongoing 
legislative process,132 whereas the D.C. Circuit enforced the legislation 
 
 127. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th Cir. 2016) (“While 
the Secretary laments this and Congress recognizes it, both are presently attempting to revive the 
process. As bleak as these circumstances appear to be, however, we are unpersuaded that Article 
III treatment of the ailing Article II patient in the manner the Hospital System urges is the answer 
or, indeed, even possible or desirable.”). 
 128. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-851 (JEB), 2016 WL 7076983, at *3 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 129. This, as the Fourth Circuit notes, is not a certainty, but is assumed in this paragraph 
arguendo. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 54–57. 
 130. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that 
equitable relief does not automatically follow a finding of a statutory violation, but that “respect 
for the autonomy and comparative institutional advantage of the executive branch has traditionally 
made courts slow to assume command over an agency’s choice of priorities” (quoting In re Barr 
Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991))), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 131. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More Judicial Activism, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERATION 11 (Giorgi Areshidze 
et al. eds., 2016) (calling for more judicial activism); cf. Norm Ornstein, How Activist Judges 
Undermine the Constitution, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2014/09/how-activist-judges-undermine-the-constitution/380413/ [https://perma.cc/ JL6M-
9WHL] (arguing against judicial activism).  
 132. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56 (“[I]f the backlog were attributable to 
Congress’ failure to fund the program more fully or otherwise to provide a legislative solution, it 
would likewise be a problem for Congress, not the courts, to address.”). 
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as written through the legislative process.133 Both courts went to great 
lengths to discuss whether mandamus jurisdiction was appropriate, based 
on canons of statutory interpretation and precedent, and both courts 
considered whether judicial action would improperly interfere with the 
role of the legislature.134 This task is particularly difficult in the 
administrative law context,135 and it is clear that both courts understood 
the importance of considering all relevant factors.  
However, understanding the cause of a problem is central to creating 
an adequate solution. Administrative agencies are in a unique position to 
develop and demand a comprehensive record that should allow for 
rational decision-making to both enforce congressional policy and avoid 
drift.136 In reviewing the agency’s failure to act, neither court showed an 
appreciation for the need to identify the cause of the problem before 
deciding whether the court could or should act with any degree of 
authority. The courts’ approach to crafting a remedy in situations of 
agency delay should be careful and narrow, speaking to the source of 
dysfunction in the facts presented. If the backlog was primarily 
attributable to inefficient management of agency resources, or even a 
willful refusal to obey the statutory requirements, then the courts’ 
contempt power may well have proven a powerful tool to fight 
institutional inertia. However, if the backlog was caused by factors 
outside of the agency’s control, such as inadequate funding, what would 
have been the next step? Was the court willing to hold the Secretary in 
contempt for the lack of congressional action? Without knowing the 
cause of the backlog, a writ of mandamus could be classified as anything 
from a risky gamble trying to provide a well-intentioned nudge in the 
right direction to an unsubstantiated bluff that encroaches on a role 
properly left to the Secretary or the Legislature.  
 
 133. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191 (“‘[H]owever many priorities the agency may 
have, and however modest its personnel and budgetary resources may be, there is a limit to how 
long it may use these justifications to excuse inaction in the face of’ a statutory deadline.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 554 
(D.C. Cir. 1999))).  
 134. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192. 
 135. See generally Now What? Some Thoughts on Judicial Remedies in Administrative Law, 
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/ 
administrative_law/2017/10/011_now_what.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX5L-Q8W8] 
(discussing the difficulties inherent in balancing judicial review of administrative decisions with 
the need for executive deference).  
 136. See generally Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments 
of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (discussing the difficulties inherent in 
balancing agency efficiency while adhering to congressional mandate).   
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C.  A “Possible” Solution 
The foregoing discussion leaves more questions than answers. How 
can the courts enforce required agency actions without risking 
overstepping into legislative policy-setting? Is there ever a “safe” 
situation to intervene, without implicating concerns about separation of 
powers? Yes, and the D.C. Circuit, on a second appeal, provided a 
pathway forward.  
The courts may intervene by incorporating an explicit factual finding 
of possibility before issuing a writ of mandamus. It is a simple but 
important idea: the courts should not order an agency to do the 
impossible.137 Therefore, before ordering an agency to act, a court should 
make an explicit factual finding that it is possible for the agency to act in 
a way that solves the problem. If the court finds that the agency’s inaction 
is due to mismanagement of resources or agency drift, mandamus can and 
should issue against the administrative agency to correct its failure to 
effectuate its duties. If, however, the court finds that the agency’s inaction 
is due to inadequate resources—a legislative matter—mandamus should 
not issue. This finding of possibility will help the court distinguish 
between situations that can guide administrative agencies to fulfill their 
mandate compared to those that would, ultimately, dictate legislative 
priorities.  
Contrary to American Hospital Association v. Price,138 this finding of 
fact should be incorporated into the initial jurisdictional or equitable 
considerations the court analyzes before issuing mandamus against an 
administrative agency in cases of delay or inaction. In American Hospital 
Association v. Price, this finding of fact was deemed to be a critical piece 
of the puzzle only on a second appeal to the D.C. Circuit.139 By 
incorporating the finding as an initial criterion, the courts can get it right 
the first time and avoid excessive and unnecessary litigation where the 
appellant is forced to plead against being held in contempt for failing to 
do the impossible.  
Furthermore, a finding of possibility can help the courts avoid 
legislating from the bench by inadvertently—or purposefully—ordering 
congressional action through judicial fiat. “[L]egislating from the bench” 
started as a political slogan but has become something of an unspoken 
and accepted reality.140 The courts are simply not designed to make 
 
 137. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (stating that “[o]ught 
implies can” when issuing a writ of mandamus). 
 138. 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 139. See id. at 161. 
 140. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Let’s Legislate from the Supreme Court Bench, N.Y. 
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complex policy decisions that undergird the appropriations process and 
should not make the attempt.141 The funding power has long been 
recognized as the quintessential legislative power.142 While the funding 
power is typically discussed at the intersection of legislative and 
executive power,143 this Note argues that the impact of the judiciary 
ordering administrative action must be examined as well. The judiciary 
can implement a safeguard against infringing on this power by 
determining, from the outset, whether it is possible for the agency to 
comply with the order sought without receiving additional resources from 
Congress.  
CONCLUSION 
When the judiciary can order the legislature to legislate, the 
fundamental structure of the American system of government is at risk. 
The courts’ failure to identify the cause of the problem does not absolve 
them of the resulting overreach into the realm of making policy decisions. 
Though mandamus was issued to an administrative agency, the writ 
evidently and eventually required legislative action for the administrative 
agency to comply.144 By not making a factual determination as to the 
cause of OMHA backlog, the D.C. Circuit purposefully disregarded the 
very real chance (which, this Note has argued, was actualized) that the 
judiciary would usurp the role of the legislature by, in effect, dictating the 
allocation of funding. By incorporating an explicit factual finding of 
possibility before issuing a writ of mandamus against an administrative 
agency for inaction or delay, the courts can avoid overreach and still 
mandate agency action when appropriate. 
 
 141. See Richard S. Wells & Joel B. Grossman, The Concept of Judicial Policy-Making: A 
Critique, 15 J. PUB. L. 286, 289 (1966).  
 142. See Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 357, 357 (2018). 
 143. See, e.g., id. at 382.  
 144. See LaPointe, supra note 104.  
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